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Japan and Her Dealings with Offshoring: 
An Empirical Analysis with Aggregate Data
* 
 
First moves towards a real understanding of offshoring date back to very recent times. In 
particular for Japan, the studies conducted so far focus alone on the productivity effects of 
offshoring at the firm level. Here I carry out the analysis of both the employment and 
productivity effects at the aggregate level of the industry, covering the years 1980-2005. 
Moreover, I consider all industries within the economy and take account of both services and 
materials offshoring. My results suggest that we should expect, on average, a positive effect 
of services and a negative effect of materials offshoring on employment. However, the effects 
are rather negligible and only amount to a 1.5 to 2 percent net loss of the change in 
employment. On the other hand, positive effects on the growth rate of productivity are found 
as a result of both types of offshoring, with larger effects from services. In particular, the 
average offshoring industry displays 1.4 to 1.98 additional percentage points for services and 
0.48 to 0.64 for materials. 
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It is now no secret that Japan has been lagging behind for the past twenty
years, running into an uncertain post-bubble era that seems to stretch to
unknown horizons. The lost decade, as it came to be known, has practically
left in the shadows the increasingly important subject of o⁄shoring, which
can have practical consequences for the competitiveness of local ￿rms and
industries when they most need it. Indeed, the recent and heated discussions
on economic policy which abound worldwide have to do with these peculiar
business practices.
The goal of this paper is to disentangle the employment and productivity
e⁄ects of o⁄shoring at the aggregate level of the industry. Highly aggregated
data not only will help reassure the previous results obtained for Japan at the
￿rm level and for particular industries but, due to their comprehensiveness,
will serve to extend the analysis to the whole economy. This is important
since one of the objectives is to see whether o⁄shoring can produce, empir-
ically, a negative e⁄ect on total employment. In addition, as is our case,
the Japan Industrial Productivity database (JIP) provides su¢ cient data for
constructing two o⁄shoring indices representative of the intensities of two
distinguishable types of o⁄shoring: services and materials (or production).
In this paper I will try to ￿nd an answer to the following questions. Is
o⁄shoring to be seen as a real threat to the economy￿ s employment level?
Are we to expect any improvement in the productivity of industries after
o⁄shoring takes place? But before these questions are properly addressed,
we should come to terms with the measurement of o⁄shoring. How are we
to proxy this phenomenon empirically?
It has been lately suggested that intermediate trade data of goods and ser-
vices can well provide with the answer (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a, 1996b,
1997, 1999). Presumably, it is the import content of inputs what best prox-
ies o⁄shoring and gives us a clue to understanding its economic implications.
We shall see that for our industry level analysis this works just ￿ne. But why
are these economic implications really important?
Although it seems reasonable to think of adjustment costs in the short
run for workers and ￿rms, one would expect the sectorial composition (rather
than the quantity) of the economy￿ s workforce to change in the future. In
the words of Blinder (2006), "the world as a whole cannot lose from increases
in productivity" that are a natural result of trade and o⁄shoring. Eventu-
ally, better paid and higher value-added jobs will open in the "relocating"
2economy due to economic scarcity.
This is not to deny the possible short-run layo⁄s or the implied dynamics
the employers have to face when dealing with the decision to go abroad. But
in the end these frictions should fade away as comparative advantages eventu-
ally turn out in increased social welfare, and the entrepreneurs ￿nally succeed
in making the most out of them. According to the classical tenets, we should
be thinking about o⁄shoring as causing as much harm to an economy￿ s labor
market as international trade might also bring about. As we shall see here,
o⁄shoring and intermediate trade can be seen interchangeably. Underlying
the empirical research laid out below is the necessity of ￿nding an empirical
answer to such tenets.
Simply put, widespread fears on the subject usually revolve around the
millions of jobs soon to be relocated from developed economies into develop-
ing ones, with a signi￿cant welfare cost in the former due to "employment
destruction". However, the media reports as well as the surveys conducted
by consulting ￿rms tend to overlook the brighter side of the story. Gains
in terms of employment and productivity for local ￿rms not only are possi-
ble, but most expected. For instance, productivity gains could translate into
price discounts and a boost in domestic demand, thus a⁄ecting employment
positively. In fact, in a time when Japan is wavering on the verge of multiple
futures and doubts start assailing the population on prospects for a possible
recovery, o⁄shoring might as well be the answer.
I therefore undertake the study of the Japanese economy for the 1980-
2005 period, using dynamic panel estimation for aggregate data. As we
will see, the little evidence that has been collected for Japan refers alone
to the disaggregate level. To carry out such endeavor I make use of the
JIP database, which covers 108 industries or branches of activities. This
is an exhaustive database with data on manufacturing industries, services
industries, and other varied activities.
The empirical research presented here is divided in two, as in Amiti and
Wei (2006). First, I take a look at the demand side of the labor market and
focus on the e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on total employment, rather than on the
relative employment among workers of di⁄erent skills or their relative wages
(as in Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a, 1996b, and 1999, for instance). And
second, I deal with the direct e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on total factor productivity,
while considering two possible ways of measuring the latter.
My results suggest: (1) that the total employment loss during 1980-2005
due to o⁄shoring was negligible (around 1.5 to 2 percent in the total in-
3crease); and (2) that the average o⁄shoring industry enjoys higher produc-
tivity growth rates, with larger e⁄ects when services activities and not goods
(material inputs) are relocated (from 1.4 to 1.98 additional percentage points
in the former case and from 0.48 to 0.64 in the latter).
An outline of the paper is the following. In Section 2 I brie￿ y review the
major works of the recent literature. Section 3 is devoted to the details of
measuring o⁄shoring properly, and to lay out the econometric methodologies
underlying our subsequent analysis. Section 4 goes over the data, an intro-
ductory statistical analysis, and the results of the set of estimated equations
regarding the employment and productivity e⁄ects of o⁄shoring. Section 5
￿nally concludes the paper.
2. The story so far
Much has been said about o⁄shoring in recent times, less indeed has been
produced in terms of sound and unambiguous empirical evidence. However,
this relatively scarce literature has taken a drastic step forward since the mid
1990s, hardly to go unnoticed. Table 1 below compiles some of the major
works.
Contributions to the subject of o⁄shoring and its interplay with labor
markets split into studies undertaken at di⁄erent levels of aggregation. Highly
aggregated (e.g. industry) works came in ￿rst place, with the focus on the
US economy and the trade and productivity-related literature.1 Later on,
with the labor market at the center of attention, several aggregate as well
as disaggregate studies began to see the light. This implied some loss of
homogeneity in the empirical de￿nition of o⁄shoring and the little tangible
consensus in the econometric approaches. As for the results, even though
some broad conclusions can be drawn, much is yet to be said about the real
impact of o⁄shoring on labor markets.
2.1. First steps and breakthrough
The ￿rst works included o⁄shoring as a source to the changes in the
skill composition of the employed workforce or the underlying relative wages.
Such economic events as the shift from nonskilled toward skilled labor or the
wage inequality among workers of di⁄erent skills, were thus explained by
1See the references cited in the next paragraphs.
4this "new" phenomenon. However, these studies found no decisive evidence
of o⁄shoring being a major driver of these relative changes. Berman et al.
(1994), Krugman (1995), Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), Leamer (1994),
Siegel and Griliches (1992), and Slaughter (1995, 2000), present research
e⁄orts on similar lines.
In the late 1990s Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1999) pro-
duced evidence for the ￿rst time in favor of a shift towards skill-intensive
activities within domestic industries due to o⁄shoring. Their rationale was:
if ￿rms respond to import competition from low-wage countries by moving
nonskilled-intensive activities abroad, then trade has to shift employment
toward skilled workers in the domestic economy. Therefore, it is the com-
position of trade and the share of intermediate inputs in particular what
matters in the end for employment and wages.
These e⁄orts described o⁄shoring as a factor-biased technological change.
In this sense, high-skilled employment results favored after o⁄shoring takes
place precisely because low-skill activities are more prone to go o⁄shore due
to potential labor cost gains. Under this perspective, o⁄shoring might just
bring about an increase in the skill-intensity of production that comes with
an increase in the wage rate for high-skilled relative to low-skilled labor.
Feenstra and Hanson argue that if certain activities at the lower end in terms
of skill intensity in the US are o⁄shored to Mexico, where they can be said to
be in the upper end of the scale, then skill intensity goes up in both countries.
Consequently, an increased demand for high-skill workers in both countries
is accompanied by a rise in their relative wages, and o⁄shoring becomes a
factor-biased technological change.
Feenstra and Hanson also contend that the previous calculations found
in earlier e⁄orts might have underestimated the real extent of o⁄shoring.
In their 1996b paper, for example, the estimations suggest that o⁄shoring
can explain up to 31 percent of the increase in the nonproduction wage
share during the 1980s for 450 US manufacturing industries. The 1999 paper
produced smaller numbers; there, o⁄shoring accounted for 13 to 23 percent of
the shift toward nonproduction labor, which is still a signi￿cant proportion.
More recent e⁄orts within the ￿eld, however, are now testing the signi￿cance
of the direct e⁄ects on employment (see, among others, Amiti and Wei, 2005









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Let us here summarize the results of the additional evidence presented
in table 1. There, it is possible to make out those works undertaken at the
aggregate level of the industry from those conducted at a more disaggregate
instance. Let us start from the former.
At this level of aggregation we can draw the following general conclusions.
For continental Europe there is evidence on both o⁄shoring being a source
of (biased) technological change (Egger and Egger, 2003 and 2005; Strauss-
Kahn, 2004; Ekholm and Hakkala 2006) and a source of employment loss
(Cadarso et al., 2008). However, the latter is dependent on the technology
level of the industries involved domestically and the destination countries.
For the UK and US there is evidence in favor of o⁄shoring as a factor biased
change (see Hijzen et al., 2005, and Canals, 2006, respectively) yet not as
a signi￿cant source of employment loss (Amiti and Wei, 2005 and 2006).
Moreover, positive productivity e⁄ects of o⁄shoring are also found for the US
(Amiti and Wei, 2006). It must be observed too, that with the exception of
both works by Amiti and Wei, the case for services o⁄shoring is not covered.
We can see that also at the disaggregate level the evidence provides with
proof for the e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on the labor markets. For continental Eu-
rope it is again possible to dig up both the relative e⁄ects (Geishecker and
G￿rg, 2005) and the direct e⁄ects (G￿rg and Hanley, 2005) upon employ-
ment. Others, however, do not ￿nd a signi￿cant direct e⁄ect on employment
(Hakkala et al., 2007). Further, evidence about the e⁄ects on labor turnover
has also been produced (Egger et al., 2003). On the UK and the US, positive
e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on productivity are obtained for the former (Girma and
G￿rg, 2004; Criscuolo and Leaver, 2005), whereas some evidence on labor
turnover due to o⁄shoring is found for latter US (Crin￿, 2010). Apparently,
services o⁄shoring is here more present than in aggregate studies, but it is
still far from receiving the deserved attention.
2.3. What￿ s with Japan?
Japan￿ s o⁄shoring little tale remains in the shadows, as it is the case
for much of the subject so far and much of Japan￿ s puzzling performance in
the 1990s. We can see from table 1 that the evidence consists of ￿rm-level
studies displaying the expected qualitative conclusions that abound elsewhere
in the literature. Namely, that a factor biased technological change might
occur when o⁄shoring takes place, favoring high-skilled workers domestically
7(Head and Ries, 2002), and that productivity gains are surely to be expected
as a result of o⁄shoring (Hijzen et al., 2006).
In the work by Head and Ries (2002), results in a set of di⁄erent speci-
￿cations and samples show that changes in overseas employment shares can
explain a 0.9 percentage point increase of the roughly 10 percentage point
increase in the share of nonproduction workers. In the paper by Hijzen et al.
(2006), a one percent increase in o⁄shoring intensity would raise productivity
growth by 0.17 percent. For the average o⁄shoring ￿rm, they ￿nd that this
would imply a 1.8 percent increase in annual productivity growth.
Tomiura￿ s work (2005), however, raises important questions around the
subject and its signi￿cance for the Japanese economy. Nearly 98 percent
of the ￿rms of the sample did not o⁄shore their production overseas. The
extensive nature of the sample employed in this study bears some limitations
though, as made explicit by the author. First, o⁄shoring of services is not
covered, and second, only manufacturing ￿rms are considered. Finally, the
survey by Ito et al. (2007) indicates that o⁄shoring is more present now
than ￿ve years ago: sampled ￿rms engaged in o⁄shoring went from 15 per-
cent in 2001 to 20 percent in 2006. Moreover, production-related tasks take
most of the o⁄shoring pie, while services o⁄shoring is still of a rather nar-
row scope. Also according to these authors, o⁄shoring for Japanese ￿rms is
mainly restricted to own a¢ liates within East Asia.
The present paper thus ￿lls in the holes left by the past literature in that:
(i) the study is carried out at the industry level; (ii) the whole economy is
considered and not just one sector; (iii) o⁄shoring of services is accounted
for; and (iv) the direct e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on employment are estimated.
3. Measurement and analytical frameworks
O⁄shoring can be measured either directly or indirectly. Nevertheless,
the lack of reliable direct data should make us consider indirect measures
to a greater extent (see Kirkegaard, 2007). The intermediate trade index I
discuss below has so far proved to be a reliable proxy.
3.1. Indirect indicators
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1999) de￿ne o⁄shoring as the
share of imported intermediate inputs in the total purchase of nonenergy
8inputs.2 They combine US import data from the four-digit SIC (Standard
Industrial Classi￿cation) with data on material purchases from the Census
of Manufactures. The census data crisscross the trade between industries of
the same level and provides the base for estimating the share of intermedi-
ate inputs in every industry. For a given industry i at time t, multiplying
the shares of input purchases from each supplier industry times the ratio of
imports to total consumption in the supplier industry, and then adding over,













where Ij is purchases of inputs j by industry i, Q is total inputs (excluding
energy) used by i, ￿j is total imports of goods j, and Dj their domestic
demands. This formula provides an index of the o⁄shoring intensity at the
industry level. It estimates the import content of intermediate trade of in-
dustries which, in turn, proxies their o⁄shoring intensities. Speci￿cally, the
￿rst term in (1) stems from the census data (or Input-Output tables), while
the second term, which is an economy-wide import share, is obtained from
the trade data. Conveniently, this expression serves as a measure for both
the traditional o⁄shoring of materials (or production-related o⁄shoring) and
the more up-to-date o⁄shoring of services (see Amiti and Wei, 2005, 2006).3
However, a common drawback to all measures relying on import shares
is that o⁄shoring does not necessarily imply an increase of imports, and vice
versa. If a local exporting ￿rm decides to move part of its production abroad
and continues exporting it from a foreign country, this would not translate
into a drop in the imports to the parent ￿rm. Rather, it would represent
a fall of its exports. Likewise, a rise in a country￿ s imports due to more
favorable terms of trade should not be linked to an expansion of o⁄shoring
2Other indices used frequently in the literature are: imported inputs in total output
(see for instance Egger and Egger, 2003), or the "vertical specialization" index, which
accounts for the share of imported inputs in exports (Campa and Goldberg, 1997, and
Hummels et al., 2001).
3It can also be useful to split o⁄shoring into its narrow and broad measures. Empirically,
the narrow measure would be restricted to the imported intermediate inputs from the
same-digit industry, whereas the broad measure would include all other industries as well.
In particular, when i = j, we have that the equation in (1) becomes the narrow measure.
9from local ￿rms. Another disadvantage of this index is that the second term
in (1), the import penetration of inputs, is usually taken as equal for every
industry (this is due to data availability). In spite of these drawbacks, the
rationale for using an index of this kind should by now be clear: importing
trade stands for an important amount of intra and inter ￿rm trade nowadays,
from which o⁄shoring could be proxied.
3.2. Analytical framework: Employment
To study the direct e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on employment I depart from
a Cobb-Douglas technology for the industry (Amiti and Wei, 2006). Thus,




with K and L being equal to capital and labor services respectively, Y the
value added, and A the time-dependent technology shifter. Also accepting
that the industries can be represented as a single cost-minimizing ￿rm (that
is, min rK + wL), from our knowledge of the production function we can
derive the cost function; hypothetically:







￿ being a constant, r and w the factor prices (the interest rate and wages,
for instance), and Y output. As we can see, the cost function and the pro-
duction function are both sides of the same coin. With exogenous input
prices, the production function and the cost function contain virtually the
same information.
It must be remembered at this point that, particularly in former e⁄orts,
it was most appealing to specify a translog cost function allowing for more
substitution possibilities among inputs. This provided with a more ￿ exible
framework as regards cross elasticities that led to the estimation of a factor-
share equation. We should keep in mind though, that the original debate was
all about explaining the wage gap (e.g. the wage skill premium) or the shifts
in relative employment of both nonskilled and skilled labor, due essentially
to some form of technological change (see Berman et al., 1994, and Feenstra
and Hanson, 1996b, most representatively). Some of the current e⁄orts,
however, try to disentangle a more direct incidence of o⁄shoring on total
employment as in, for example, Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006) or Cadarso et
al. (2008), who implicitly assume a Cobb-Douglas technology. In this way
10we have that cost minimization, which entails the optimal demand for inputs
given a certain level of output, is characterized by the conditional demand
for labor augmented by other factor prices.
Following Hamermesh (1993), minimizing total costs in (3) using Shep-
hard￿ s lemma (Hicks, 1939; Samuelson, 1947; Shephard, 1953) yields the
factor demand functions for K and L. For the labor factor we have, in
general form:
L = ￿(w;p;Y ) (4)
where the demand for labor depends on wages w, other factor prices p, and
an output measure Y: Among input prices other than r, we can identify,
following Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006), the price of foreign labor services.






0 is a vector of factor prices other than those of foreign services (pos).
Since data on pos are often hard to get, these authors propose the o⁄shoring




;Y;OSS;OSM) j A(OSS;OSM) (6)
where OSS and OSM are the services and materials o⁄shoring indices, and
A is the technology shifter dependent on o⁄shoring. Here Amiti and Wei
(2005, 2006) identify three channels through which o⁄shoring comes to a⁄ect
the labor demand. First, a possible substitution e⁄ect between labor and
prices of imported inputs (services or materials); a drop in the latter or,
equivalently, an increase in the o⁄shoring indices, would lead to a fall in
the demand for labor. Second, a possible short-run productivity e⁄ect of
o⁄shoring to impact negatively on employment. And third, the scale e⁄ect
(or long-run productivity e⁄ect) which might a⁄ect labor positively, provided
￿rms are more e¢ cient and competitive in the longer run due to previous
productivity gains.
Log-linearizing and adding the subscripts to the previous formulation, I
obtain a widely used equation in the recent literature:
11lnLit = ￿o + ￿1 lnLit￿1 + ￿2OSSit + ￿3OSMit + ￿4 lnwit + ￿5 lnp
0
it
+￿6 lnYit + ￿idi + ￿tdt (7)
Labor is regressed on its lagged value and a set of other explanatory
variables, where the subscript i stands for industry and t for time. The in-
troduction of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side is justi￿ed
since we can reasonably suppose that labor does not adjust automatically to
changes in the other variables. Or, what is the same, that the level of employ-
ment might deviate from its steady state when the adjustment takes place
(see Cadarso et al., 2008, and G￿rg and Hanley, 2005). Explanatory variables
include, respectively: the services and materials o⁄shoring intensity indices,
OSS and OSM, the real average wages w, other factor prices p
0 (such as
r), and an output measure Y . Here we can use the output (either volume
or value), the capital stock, or some measure of R&D investment. Industry
and year ￿xed e⁄ects also enter the equation through the dummy variables,
di and dt. For the bene￿t of clarity, error terms are omitted here and in the
following section.
Introducing lags of both OSS and OSM into equation (7) would allow
us to account for the long run scale e⁄ects of o⁄shoring. The signs of the
coe¢ cients would eventually tell the ￿nal e⁄ect on employment. The sim-
ple methodology undertaken here is only concerned with the direct e⁄ects
of o⁄shoring within industries, while no industrial spillovers are taken ac-
count of.4 Therefore, the expected signs of the coe¢ cients ￿2 and ￿3 are
inconclusive, since it is not clear whether the scale e⁄ect is large enough to
outweigh the substitution and productivity e⁄ects within the same industry.
As stated before, the output may be increased (and employment with it) in
response to o⁄shoring-related productivity gains. Moreover, I expect that
￿4 < 0 (a downward-sloping labor demand), and ￿5 > 0 (if inputs are gross
substitutes). Notice too that no restrictions are imposed on the coe¢ cients
as to comply with the constant returns to scale (CRS) hypothesis, since this
is not found to hold on several speci￿cations of the production function.
A couple of remarks by Amiti and Wei (2006) need be recapped. First, re-
4For this see Egger and Egger (2005), who claim that the ￿nal e⁄ect of o⁄shoring could
be strongly underrepresented if spillover e⁄ects are not being considered.
12lying on the assumption of perfect mobility of labor across industries, we have
that wages are exogenously determined. If that is not the case though, then
wages are endogenous. Provided that these potential rents are unchanged
over time, we can assume that they would be absorbed by the industry ￿xed
e⁄ects (￿i), so the results would still be unbiased. Second, the price of other
inputs (such as imported inputs and the rental on capital) are considered as
a function of time, so they are captured by the time ￿xed e⁄ects (￿t). And
lastly, these authors prefer the use of the output variable as a control, which
supposes a strong endogeneity problem. Even though this is conventional in
most empirical work, the estimated equation remains of doubtful interpreta-
tion as the coe¢ cient on the real wage variable represents a partial and not
a total elasticity (Webster, 2003).5 For this reason, the exogenously deter-
mined capital stock variable is made explicit in our ￿nal estimating equation
with no output variables:






Notwithstanding the previous assumptions in the last few paragraphs,
the estimation of the panel in equation (8) still entails potential endogene-
ity problems due to the o⁄shoring variables. A potential bias in the OLS
estimates is expected and should make us consider the implementation of
instrumental variables techniques.
3.3. Analytical framework: Productivity
Productivity can be measured in multiple ways. Fundamentally, it can
be either measured as the ratio of a volume measure of output to a volume
measure of input, or as a measure depending on all types of inputs. In this
way it is possible to distinguish between labor and capital productivity on the
one hand (a single-factor measure), and total factor productivity (TFP) on
the other (that is, a multi-factor measure). Di⁄erent measures of outputs and
inputs and, thus, of productivity, re￿ ect di⁄erent representations of the same
5Webster (2003) carries on: "A total elasticity includes the full e⁄ects on employment,
once the e⁄ects on intermediate variables such as output have been worked through. Par-
tial elasticities are the e⁄ects if one or more of these intermediate variables are arti￿cially
held constant. Partial elasticities are arti￿cial ￿ thought experiments￿ , as in real life it is
not possible to control most variables." (p. 135, footnote 5).
13production process in a particular industry (Zheng, 2005). I am interested
in calculating two of these widely used measures of the TFP for Japan and
then estimate the direct e⁄ects of o⁄shoring. This is the usual two-stage
estimation methodology.6
First we have a generalization of the gross value added (or net output)
representation of the production function. Gross value added is obtained
by deducting intermediate consumption from gross output; at factor costs it
includes: wages, consumption of ￿xed capital, and pre-tax pro￿ts. Supposing
a Cobb-Douglas technology and omitting subscripts, such an output measure
can be represented by:





where gross real value added YV depends on labor L, capital K, and the
Hicks-neutral and time-dependent technological parameter A
0(t).
Additionally, we can consider the gross output-based measure, which is a
representation of the production function augmented by the consumption of
materials and services inputs:







where gross real output YO depends on labor L, capital K, materials inputs
M, services inputs S, and the neutral technological shifter A
00(t).
Taking logarithms and di⁄erentiating both expressions with respect to
time we get, through Euler￿ s theorem, the contributions of the growth in
inputs to the growth in output:
.
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G are the elasticities of output to the di⁄erent
inputs (Zh), and
:










00 are the changes in
6Hijzen et al. (2006) also adopt this two-step estimation procedure for Japan, yet their
study is conducted at the ￿rm level.
14the Hicks-neutral residuals (e.g. technical progress). Under the simplifying
assumptions of CRS and perfect competition in the market of both output





























Because of the competitive equilibrium assumption in particular, equa-
tions (13) and (14) also imply the equivalence between factor income shares
and output elasticities. That is, sh ￿
phZh
pV YV = ￿h and s0
h ￿
phZh
pOYO = ￿h, with ph
the price or return to inputs, and pV and pO the prices of real value-added and
real gross output respectively. Each input is thus paid its marginal product.7
In order to keep consistency with the previous section, the CRS hypothesis
is here relaxed. To account for non-constant returns (non-CRS) I follow Liu
and Li (2008) decomposition approach,8 which would imply modifying the
output growth equations (11) and (12) as to adjust for the economies of scale
e⁄ect. As seen in both these equations, when CRS apply, output growth can
be decomposed into the weighted sum of input growth and technical progress.
However, in the presence of non-CRS, Euler￿ s equations can now be rewritten
in general terms as:9
.







where ￿h is the output elasticity to input Zh, ￿ is the sum of these elasticities
(￿h ￿h), and
:
A is the technical progress. When production is CRS, ￿ = 1,
7Generally speaking, for a production function with a single input Z a simple pro-
ductivity measure is given by Y
Z. When considering multiple inputs, the TFP can be
de￿ned as TFP = Y






￿. We have that
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Z, which corresponds to the subtracting terms in the right-hand side
of (13) and (14), namely: ￿h sh
:





8Other references of interest are the work by Kee (2004) and the methodological review
by Van Beveren (2007), which go over the di⁄erent alternatives when classical hypotheses
do not hold.
9See Liu and Li (2008) for the formal derivation.
15and equation (15) reduces to
.




A, which is a generalization of
(11) and (12). By subtracting and adding ￿h
￿h
￿ Zh and rearranging terms,
equation (15) then becomes:
.











Equation (16) shows that output growth can now be decomposed into
three components: the adjusted economies of scale e⁄ect, the weighted sum
of input growth, and technical progress. This decomposition can be applied
to the decomposition of productivity growth as well. As before, subtracting
the growth in inputs to the growth in output yields the unobservable residual
term:
.







which is the sum of the ￿rst and last terms in equation (16). Hence, the
TFP growth has two components: the adjusted economies of scale e⁄ect and




A, as in Solow
(1957). Therefore, as argued by Liu and Li, "as long as the parameters of
the production function can be estimated", equation (16) "can be used for
the empirical estimation of the sources of output growth" and, by extension,
equation (17) can be used to extract the sources of productivity growth.
Estimating expressions (11) and (12) and then using (16) and (17) to account











O. These are two common measures of productivity growth









O are constructed I am able to estimate the
10See Griliches (1996) and Hulten (2001) for a bibliographical survey and Zheng (2005)
for a review of the main indices (which are not considered here) that can be derived from
the production function using a nonparametric approach. According to this author, these
indices can account for the technological change of a more general nature (e.g. non-neutral
Hicks). For instance, in a production function like Y = H(AK;L), the residual a⁄ects
capital but not labor; in Y = H(K;AL) it a⁄ects labor but not capital. These two
cases can be described as Hicks-biased, and would account for a rotation of the isoquant
curves (instead of a shift, which is our case). For our purposes here, the derivation of
our productivity measures in equation (17) through the parametric estimation of (11) and
(12) will su¢ ce.
16e⁄ects of o⁄shoring directly. We should remember, though, that since the
TFP growth measures are estimated relying on the real values of inputs and
output, the cost-saving motive usually attached to o⁄shoring is therefore
left out of the analysis. Adding subscripts, the second stage reduced-form
estimating equation is simply:
.
TFP it = ’1
.
TFP it￿1 + ’2OSSit + ’3OSMit + ￿idi + ￿tdt (18)
where
.










￿JIP. Additionally, we have the lagged dependent variable which would
account for the persistence of TFP growth over time, our o⁄shoring indices
(OSS and OSM), and industry and year ￿xed e⁄ects (di and dt). I expect the
coe¢ cients associated to both OSS and OSM to be positive independently of
the TFP measure considered. According to Amiti and Wei (2006) o⁄shoring
can increase productivity either due to compositional or structural changes.
First, relocating ine¢ cient parts of the production process to another country
could increase the productivity of the remaining workers. And second, due
to the access to new inputs, productivity increases are also likely, yet with
larger e⁄ects arising from services o⁄shoring.
As with employment, potential endogeneity of o⁄shoring is also present
in equation (18). Either more productive industries self select into o⁄shoring
or, conversely, industries that expect a fall in productivity growth increase
their levels of o⁄shoring in the hope of increasing their productivity (Amiti




The JIP database (2006, 2008) provides a comprehensive source for a
wide set of variables through a relatively long time period and for the whole
Japanese economy. It comprises annual data for the period 1970-2005 and for
a total of 108 activities from both the manufacturing and services sectors (see
table 2). Strictly speaking, this classi￿cation does not correspond exactly to
the industry classi￿cation usually found elsewhere (e.g. ISIC, rev. 3, or the
EU KLEMS project), yet stands as a faithful approximation (see Fukao et
al., 2007). The database includes 54 manufacturing activities, 42 services
activities, and 12 activities from the primary sector plus energy.
17Table 2: The JIP database, economic branches of activity
JIP code Manufacturing JIP code Services JIP code Other
008 Livestock products 067 Wholesale 001 Rice, wheat production
009 Seafood products 068 Retail 002 Miscellaneous crop farming
010 Flour and grain mill products 069 Finance 003 Livestock and sericulture farming
011 Miscellaneous foods 070 Insurance 004 Agricultural services
012 Animal foods & fertilizers 071 Real estate 005 Forestry
013 Beverages 072 Housing 006 Fisheries
014 Tobacco 073 Railway 007 Mining
015 Textile products 074 Road transportation 062 Electricity
016 Lumber and wood products 075 Water transportation 063 Gas, heat supply
017 Furniture and fixtures 076 Air transportation 064 Waterworks
018 Pulp, paper, and other paper 077 Other transportation 065 Water supply for industrial use
019 Paper products 078 Telegraph and telephone 066 Waste disposal
020 Printing, and plate making 079 Mail
021 Leather and leather products 080 Education (private and non-p)
022 Rubber products 081 Research (private)
023 Chemical fertilizers 082 Medical (private)
024 Basic inorganic chemicals 083 Hygiene (private and non-p)
025 Basic organic chemicals 084 Other public services
026 Organic chemicals 085 Advertising
027 Chemical fibers 086 Rental of office equipment
028 Miscellaneous chemical pdts. 087 Automobile maintenance
029 Pharmaceutical products 088 Other services for businesses
030 Petroleum products 089 Entertainment
031 Coal products 090 Broadcasting
032 Glass and its products 091 Information and Internet ss.
033 Cement and its products 092 Publishing
034 Pottery 093 Video and sound
035 Miscellaneous ceramic 094 Eating and drinking places
036 Pig iron and crude steel 095 Accommodation
037 Miscellaneous iron and steel 096 Laundry, beauty services
038 Smelting non-ferrous metals 097 Other services for individuals
039 Non-ferrous metal products 098 Education (public)
040 Metal products 099 Research (public)
041 Miscellaneous metal products 100 Medical (public)
042 General industry machinery 101 Hygiene (public)
043 Special industry machinery 102 Ss. ins. & ss. welfare (public)
044 Miscellaneous machinery 103 Public administration
045 Office and industry machines 104 Medical (non-profit)
046 Electrical and ind. apparatus 105 Ss. Ins. & ss. welfare (non-p)
047 Household electric appliances 106 Research (non-profit)
048 Electronics, computer eqpmnt. 107 Other (non-profit)
049 Communication equipment 108 Activities not classified
050 Measuring instruments




055 Motor vehicle parts
056 Other transportation eqpmnt.





Source: JIP database (2006, 2008). RIETI, Hitotsubashi University, and ESRI, Japan.
184.1.2. Materials and services o⁄shoring
To estimate the o⁄shoring index I employ the de￿nition in (1) above,
resorting exclusively to the JIP database. This is a positive feature since the
Feenstra and Hanson-type index necessarily takes data from intermediate
inputs and trade, which usually stem from di⁄erent sources.
Figure 1: Materials and services o⁄shoring (%)
Note: o⁄shoring indices (OSS;OSM) according to formula (1).
Broad measures, weighted by industry value-added (own calculation, JIP database).
From (1) we have that the index on materials o⁄shoring is the import
content in all materials inputs. Hence, the ￿rst term is the input purchases
of material j by industry i at time t, as a share of that industry￿ s total
use of materials inputs. The second term is a global measure of the import
penetration of the referred input j which, even though is time-varying, it
remains ￿xed across industries or branches of activities. This implies the
assumption that all industries carry out the importing of these materials
with the same intensity. The same reasoning applies to the construction
of the services o⁄shoring index. Figure 1 and table 3 show the evolution
19of materials and services o⁄shoring according to formula (1), weighted by
industry value added.11;12
Table 3: O⁄shoring intensity, whole economy
Year OSM (%) annual g.r. (%) OSS (%) annual g.r. (%)
1980 2.72 - 1.22 -
1981 2.84 4.54 1.33 8.70
1982 2.97 4.34 1.47 10.95
1983 2.99 0.92 1.54 4.73
1984 2.98 -0.28 1.56 1.18
1985 3.03 1.70 1.46 -6.71
1986 3.68 21.41 1.75 20.33
1987 4.28 16.16 1.97 12.27
1988 4.62 7.92 2.15 9.18
1989 5.03 8.89 2.35 9.46
1990 5.26 4.60 2.61 10.80
1991 5.24 -0.34 2.52 -3.33
1992 5.50 4.87 2.44 -2.96
1993 5.75 4.63 2.41 -1.59
1994 6.03 4.76 2.31 -3.80
1995 6.21 3.08 2.17 -6.21
1996 6.29 1.21 2.13 -1.99
1997 6.50 3.43 2.12 -0.52
1998 7.08 8.88 2.14 0.99
1999 7.63 7.73 2.18 1.93
2000 8.04 5.37 2.13 -2.16
2001 8.60 6.94 2.14 0.29
2002 9.20 7.08 2.14 -0.02
2003 9.68 5.19 2.10 -1.93
2004 10.22 5.55 2.08 -0.58
2005 10.45 2.23 2.04 -2.30
avg. annual g.r. (%) 5.31 1.98
up until 1989 6.35 6.77
1990 to 2005 4.38 -1.53
11In order to come up with the o⁄shoring indices I used the Input-Output tables in
section 1.4 of JIP, and the ￿nal demand tables in section 1.7, both at constant prices
(2000). The import ￿gures had to be linearly interpolated; only years 1980, 1985, 1990,
1995, and 2000 were available. As a result, the econometric analysis below starts in 1980.
Due to a possible aggregation bias (which underlies the whole empirical analysis), the
measurement errors of the o⁄shoring index, and the potential endogeneity of this variable
in the econometric analysis below, it is important to note that any conclusions should be
interpreted with caution.
12The average annual growth rates in table 3 are calculated using a compound








20Let it be warned that the OSS and OSM indices are not directly compa-
rable because the denominators are not the same. Recall that what we have
is the import content of inputs (either services or materials) in terms of the
total use of these same inputs (foreign and domestic). Other studies propose
to set this share in terms of the total use of all inputs (services plus materi-
als, both foreign and domestic), just to be able to derive an index of "total
o⁄shoring" later. As we happened to de￿ne o⁄shoring this is not possible
here, yet I believe that our indices stand closer to measuring the real extent
of o⁄shoring because services and materials o⁄shoring are intrinsically very
di⁄erent phenomena.
Three things are worth commenting at this point. First, materials o⁄-
shoring is expectedly more predominant, as its development dates back to
much earlier times.13 Second, the annual rate of growth of services o⁄shoring
is, on average, surprisingly smaller than that of materials in the whole sam-
ple period. Due to an ever-increasing globalized world where technologies
abound and change fast for the better, one should have expected the oppo-
site to be true. Yet this only happened in the period before the bubble crisis
and the lost decade, when the rates of growth were approximately equal.
And third, it is to stress the slowdown in both indices￿growth rates, but
especially in services o⁄shoring, during the lost decade and up until recent
times. The average annual growth rate for services o⁄shoring was in fact
negative during that period. A possible explanation, which adds to that of
the domestic crisis, is the loss of appeal for services o⁄shoring to be hosted
in neighboring Asian countries. This might be due to the relative loss of
competitiveness that comes with the catch-up process experienced in those
fast-growing economies.14
4.1.3. A lost decade of growth
Using data from 1970 to 2005 I estimate the output elasticities in (11) and
(12). Then I combine this information with equations (16) and (17) and get
both TFP growth rates adjusted by the economies of scale e⁄ect. Equations
(11) and (12) were estimated through a panel considering ￿xed e⁄ects and
cross-section weights. The database was ￿ltered as to be left only with those
13This is true for the whole economy and when separating between manufacturing and
services industries. This breakdown is however not presented for reasons of space.
14Ito et al. (2007) highlight the preference for large-sized Japanese ￿rms to have their
relocation processes being channeled into the region.
21industries where their labor shares delivered a sensible result (e.g. they were
less than 1). As a result, I am left with 83 industries out of a total of 108.
Figure 2 displays, for the 1980-2005 period, our value-added-based and
gross output-based productivity measures as well as the one calculated by
the JIP (Fukao et al., 2004, 2007), which is also a gross output measure (e.g.
it takes account of intermediate inputs).
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Gross output-based (own calculation, adjusted by non-CRS)
Value-added-based (own calculation, adjusted by non-CRS)
Gross output-based (JIP calculation, CRS assumed)
(%)
Note: mean values across 83 industries (due to data cleaning).
It is to note the somewhat pessimistic performance in the annual growth
rates of the TFP during the 1990s, as compared to previous years. This is
attenuated in the JIP measure, which portrays a less volatile pattern. Notice
too that while both measures calculated in this paper are adjusted by non-
CRS, the other is not. Another di⁄erence is that, despite being the same data,
the JIP￿ s methodology addresses the estimation of the TFP growth from an
industry by industry perspective which makes use of speci￿c input indices
(see Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967, and Gollop and Jorgenson, 1980).15 In
15For instance: "the index of capital input is derived by the aggregation of several types
22spite of these di⁄erences, the correlation coe¢ cients with the JIP measure
for 1980-2005 are 0.63 (value-added) and 0.68 (gross output).
The use of labor and capital indices which accounted for the quality of
labor and capacity utilization is said to come as a sophistication over previous
estimations on the Japanese TFP (Fukao et al., 2004). However, due to the
aggregation entailed by our approach and the assumed exogeneity of the TFP
variable, I simply use the number of workers and the real capital stock as
the input variables. These TFP measures are later used in the econometric
analysis.
4.2. How good are the o⁄shoring measures?
To answer this question I carry out a decomposition analysis over time
(1980-2005) in a rather conventional way. The analysis involves following the
"within" and "between" exercise to account for variations of, respectively,
the industries￿o⁄shoring intensity and their shares in total production.16
Decomposing the variance turns out helpful in isolating the changes in the
o⁄shoring intensities within industries from the changes in the production
shares between them. Thus, it is easy to see what proportion of the change
in the index is due to either a change in real o⁄shoring or a change in the
industries￿relative weights. The index might as well be picking up structural
in￿ uences that have nothing to do with o⁄shoring.
Therefore, to see to what extent the index describes the phenomenon












￿i￿￿i ; ￿ = OSS;OSM
where the change in the o⁄shoring index at the country level (￿) is decom-
posed, throughout industries (i), into the change in the o⁄shoring intensity
(the within term) and the change in the share of total production (the be-
tween term). The former ￿xes the structural component of industries, also
of assets, structures, and equipment. The labor input index is an aggregate of the number
of workers cross-classi￿ed by sex, age, employment status, and educational attainment"
(Fukao et al., 2007).
16See Horgos (2009), Hummels et al. (2001), and Strauss-Kahn (2004), who also under-
take decomposition analyses along these lines.
23the share of industry output to total output (￿), to focus on the change
in the o⁄shoring intensity (￿). The latter, contrariwise, ￿xes the o⁄shoring
component, thus capturing the contribution of the structural component to
the change in the index. A bar over the variables de￿nes the mean for the
period under study.
Table 4 breaks down the sources of growth for the index during the whole
sample and in two subsamples (1980-1990 and 1990-2005).
Table 4: Sources of growth of the o⁄shoring index
Within Between Total (w+b) Within/Total
OSS
1980-1990 1.37 0.01 1.38 99.0%
1990-2005 -0.51 -0.06 -0.57 90.2%
1980-2005 0.84 -0.03 0.81 103.5%
OSM
1980-1990 2.53 0.01 2.54 99.5%
1990-2005 5.25 -0.07 5.19 101.3%
1980-2005 7.79 -0.07 7.73 100.9%
Note: numbers were rounded.
With the exception of the last column, all numbers are the increases and
drops in the indices, in percentage points, that could be derived from table
3. The column labeled "within" captures the change in the index that is
due to changes in the o⁄shoring intensities of industries alone, while the
column labeled "between" seizes the change in the index that corresponds
to a change in the production shares. The contributions of each component
are summed up under "total", and refer to the total change, in percentage
points, in the indices shown before. For instance, during 1980-1990, the
increase in the OSS index for the whole economy was 1.38 percentage points
(see table 3), of which 1.37 correspond to a change in the o⁄shoring intensity
and 0.01 to a change in the structural component. Lastly, the "within/total"
column focuses on the proportion of the change in the index that is exclusively
explained by a change in o⁄shoring intensity.
In general, we can see that the changes in the o⁄shoring intensity across
all branches of activities account for most of the growth in overall o⁄shoring,
as shown in table 3. The structural components have hardly any incidence on
the indices, especially prior to the "lost decade". After 1990 the ratios in the
24last column behave less consistently and deviate a bit from the 100 percent
benchmark. Naturally, we should expect the economic turmoil in the 1990s to
produce some changes in the sector composition of the Japanese economy.17
All in all, the index performs acceptably well for the whole sample yet less
smoothly during the fading 1990s.
4.3. Econometric analysis
Having determined the suitability of the index, I now proceed to gauge the
employment and productivity e⁄ects relying on panel data analysis. Prior
to the discussion of the results, some general remarks on the estimation
methodology need be made. In addition, table 5 below provides the summary
statistics of the main variables.
Table 5: Summary, 1980-2005 (means across 83 industries)
Variable Observations Mean Max. Min. Std. dv.
Offshoring OSSit (%) 2158 2.13 25.11 0.54 1.34
indices OSMit (%) 2158 8.03 114.12 0.62 12.58
Productivity τ'Vit (%) 2158 1.97 126.16 -120.39 13.49
growth τ'Oit (%) 2158 1.30 35.45 -29.32 5.19
rates τ JIPit (%) 2158 0.46 34.42 -36.41 5.20
Inputs and Lit (workers) 2158 554,525 7,285,919 1,767 983,149
Output Kit (real, million yen) 2158 8,436,522 123,477,018 60,968 15,885,311
Yit (real, million yen)* 2158 3,406,296 38,767,333 34,133 5,121,855
Wages wit (avg., real, million yen) 2158 5.15 34.84 0.33 3.38
*: gross value-added (factor prices).
In a panel estimation framework, heterogeneity bias usually implies the
inclusion of either ￿xed or random e⁄ects which can capture the di⁄erences
among cross-sections better than a pooled estimation. However, since we
17Coincidentally, it is argued that the three-sector hypothesis has taken longer to mani-
fest in Japan (see Balassa and Noland, 1988). Whereas for other developed economies the
shift from the secondary (manufacturing) to the tertiary (services) sector has long taken
place, for Japan it seemingly started out during the 1990s.
25are dealing with dynamic panels where we assume a large number of cross-
sections (N) compared to the number of periods (T), the OLS and ￿xed
e⁄ects estimators are inconsistent. In particular, whereas the former tends to
overestimate the autoregressive coe¢ cient the latter tends to underestimate
it.
Moreover, in our case it also becomes important to address the potential
endogeneity of the o⁄shoring variable, since it might not be random which
industries engage more in this practice. If the same industries engage in
o⁄shoring all over the sample then industry ￿xed e⁄ects would do the job.
This is hardly the case though and, on top of that, the endogeneity of the
o⁄shoring variable is further magni￿ed due to the presence of measurement
errors.
Hence, I deem it necessary to rely on GMM estimation. To remove the
permanent industry-speci￿c e⁄ects from our ￿nal estimating equations,18 we
need to transform the variables either into ￿rst-di⁄erences (Arellano and
Bond, 1991) or orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Potential
measurement problems underlying the o⁄shoring index would lead us to opt
for the latter, since ￿rst-di⁄erencing tends to amplify such problems through
larger variances.19
Therefore, to study the e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on both employment and
productivity I present several estimations based on the GMM estimator (both
in ￿rst di⁄erences and orthogonal deviations). When possible, the coe¢ cients
of all speci￿cations are reparametrized to show the total e⁄ects concentrated
in period t. Joint Wald tests are presented along the estimations to ensure
that this is possible and the coe¢ cients do not cancel out. More, some
of these speci￿cations include time dummies to control for period speci￿c
shocks common to all industries. These time dummies are also used (no
transformation involved) as additional instruments to the speci￿c ones used
in the ￿nal equations. For the labor demand in equation (8) I use period-
speci￿c (predetermined) instruments and exogenous ones. Speci￿cally, they
involve all valid lags of the dependent variable from t￿2 to T on the one hand,
and the ￿rst two lags of real wages and capital, wit￿1;wit￿2;Kit￿1;Kit￿2,
18These are equation (8) in section 3.2 for the employment analysis and equation (18)
in section 3.3 for the productivity analysis.
19Another method would be system GMM, which combines the estimation of an equation
in ￿rst di⁄erences with an equation in levels. However, this approach is not undertaken
here for it was not available while running our regressions in Eviews.
26all in logs, on the other hand.20 For the TFP equation I use the lags of
the dependent variable from t ￿ 2 to T, as well as the ￿rst two lags of
other explanatory variables. Finally, the validity of the instrument sets and
of the overidentifying restrictions is tested using the conventional Sargan
test. The consistency of the GMM estimates also depends on the absence
of serial correlation in the errors. In this regards, the m2 statistic proposed
by Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for the absence of second-order serial
correlation in the residuals.
4.3.1. Employment e⁄ects
To capture the employment e⁄ects of o⁄shoring I estimate the labor de-
mand equation in (8) using the GMM estimator. Our variables of interest are
OSS and OSM, and since these are not transformed into logarithms, they
should be interpreted as semi-elasticities. Table 6 below shows the equa-
tions estimated by di⁄erence GMM (GMM-DIF) and GMM in orthogonal
deviations (GMM-OD), with and without a full set of year dummies. As
for the assumed GMM weighting, all four equations are estimated with the
Arellano-Bond 2-step estimator, which updates weights once.21
Notice that all the equations are characterized by a large persistence coef-
￿cient, indicating a strong inertia in the industries￿aggregate level of employ-
ment. The Wald test for the lagged employment coe¢ cient being equal to 1
(unit root) is strongly rejected in all cases. Related to this, Agnese and Sala
(2009) estimate a system of structural equations for Japan consisting of a
labor demand and a labor supply equations.22 Even though o⁄shoring is not
considered there, the labor demand equation appears with a high autoregres-
sive coe¢ cient (0.89). Also to note is the similarity between the estimated
coe¢ cients, or short-run elasticities, of the real wages. In the present work
this elasticity ranges between -0.02 and -0.03, while in the previously referred
paper is approximately -0.04. This would imply a long-run elasticity of 0.37
in the work by Agnese and Sala (see p.432) and values around the 0.4-0.6
20This strategy is employed by Layard and Nickell (1986) who estimate a labor demand
function similar to (8) in a dynamic (unbalanced) panel of 1031 observations (140 ￿rms,
years 1976-1984).
21The standard errors for the two-step estimator may not be reliable (see Arellano and
Bond, 1991).
22Their dataset contains data at the country level from the OECD Economic Outlook,
which is used to carry out a time-series analysis for the years 1972-2006.
27range, as can be deduced from table 6.23 One ￿nal resemblance lies in the
fact that the capital variable in levels does not enter the labor demand equa-
tion. For all speci￿cations in table 6 I fail to reject the Wald of both the
current and lagged coe¢ cients of capital being jointly non-signi￿cant, so the
variable enters in di⁄erences. This means that what we have as ￿lnKit is
the real investment.24
With the exception of the capital variable, all other variables enter the
equations both in levels and di⁄erences. This means that the short-run elas-
ticities (or semi-elasticities, for the o⁄shoring variables) can be directly read
from the estimated coe¢ cients of the variables in levels. This reparame-
trization is made possible because the coe¢ cients of the current and lagged
variables (easily) pass the Wald tests of joint signi￿cance. But prior to ana-
lyzing the e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on employment it is necessary to spend a word
on our misspeci￿cation tests, also reported in table 6.
Under the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid,
the Sargan statistic is distributed as a ￿2(k ￿ p), where k is the instrument
rank and p the number of estimated coe¢ cients. Thus, not rejecting the
Sargan test is indicative of the exogeneity of the instruments used. Notice
that for the regressions without period dummies, (1) and (3), these tests are
easily passed, yet when period dummies are included, like in (2) and (4), these
tests are only passed at the margin. As for the m2 statistic, speci￿cation (1)
seems to su⁄er of autocorrelation of second order in the residuals, so the
estimates are not consistent. As for the rest the null hypothesis is rejected,
and in particular for (3), it is strongly rejected.25 Let us now take a closer
look at the o⁄shoring coe¢ cients.
23From equation (8) we have that the long-run elasticity of employment to a change in







24Agnese and Sala (2008) study the harming e⁄ects of a sharp decline in real investment
in Japan. Their simulations suggest that this has been decisive in explaining the sudden
upsurge in the unemployment rate during the 1990s, perhaps as a practical consequence
of comparatively lower productivity rates.
25An option to perform this test directly in Eviews was not available. For this reason I
had to reestimate all models adding the residuals lagged two periods, both as explanatory
variable and instrument. Perhaps under the hypothesis of no correlation the t statistic of
the added variable is distributed as N(0;1), but this has not been proved.
28Table 6: Labor demand, GMM estimation
(83 industries, 1980-2005)
Dependent variable:  ln Lit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GMM-DIF GMM-DIF GMM-OD GMM-OD
ln Lit-1 0.95† 0.95† 0.95† 0.95†
(0.001) (0.01) (0.001) (0.005)
ln wit -0.03† -0.02† -0.03† -0.03†
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002)
Δ ln wit -0.07† -0.06† -0.10† -0.10†
(0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
OSSit / 100 1.02† 0.92 1.03† 0.53‡
(0.07) (0.71) (0.06) (0.25)
Δ OSSit / 100 -0.50† * -0.59† *
(0.03) (0.13)
OSMit / 100 -0.26† -0.14 -0.33† -0.23‡ †
(0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.13)
Δ OSMit /100 -0.46† * -0.47† *
(0.03) (0.03)
ln Kit * * * *
Δ ln Kit 0.27† 0.20† 0.21† 0.17†
(0.004) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Joint tests (Wald):
ln Lit-1 = 1 χ
2(1) = 2,440 χ
2(1) = 13.07 χ
2(1) = 2,912 χ
2(1) = 73.25
p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00
ln wit + ln wit-1 = 0 χ
2(1) = 503.2 χ
2(1) = 9.59 χ
2(1) = 1,013 χ
2(1) = 142.3
p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00
OSSit + OSSit-1 = 0 χ
2(1) = 131.6 - χ
2(1) = 276.9 -
p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00
OSMit + OSMit-1 = 0 χ
2(1) = 115.2 - χ
2(1) = 461.3 -
p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00
ln Kit + ln Kit-1 = 0 χ
2(1) = 0.90 χ
2(1) = 2.16 χ
2(1) = 1.28 χ
2(1) = 1.98
p-value = 0.34 p-value = 0.14 p-value = 0.25 p-value = 0.16
Sargan test: χ
2(76) = 90.19 χ
2(53) = 68.65 χ
2(76) = 82.49 χ
2(53) = 66.24
p-value = 0.18 p-value = 0.07 p-value = 0.28 p-value = 0.10
m2 test: z = -16.83 z = -1.63 z = 0.38 z = 1.68
p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.10 p-value = 0.70 p-value = 0.10
Period dummies no yes no yes
s.e. 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
Adj. r
2 0.05 0.11 0.96 0.96
observations 1,992 2,075 1,992 2,075
*: strongly non-significant, individually or jointly (variable removed).
Note: all specifications estimated with Eviews and based on equation (8). GMM-DIF is the Arellano -Bond
(1991)  estima tor  in  first  differences and GMM-OD the  Arellano -Bover  (1995)  estimator  in  orthogonal
deviations. Both are estimated using the 2 -step method by Arellano andBond (1991), so the standard errors
may not be reliable. Results from 1-step estimations with the GMM-DIF were rather similar.The offshoring
indices (%) are divided by 100 so as to interpret the semi -elasticities directly. Standard errors in parentheses
and † , ‡ , and ‡ †the usual levels of significance: 1%, 5%, and 10%; Δ is the difference operator.
29All labor demand equations show a positive e⁄ect of services o⁄shoring
and a negative e⁄ect of materials o⁄shoring. This is not counterintuitive at
all, since both types of o⁄shoring entail very di⁄erent processes. The dissim-
ilarities go from radically di⁄erent managerial strategies to di⁄erent business
relations with providers or local partners, as well as a rather disparate per-
ception on the degree of customer satisfaction. Services o⁄shoring very often
includes more dynamic activities involving more highly trained workers. In
this sense, relocating services activities abroad might turn into positive em-
ployment e⁄ects domestically, by way of complementing and expanding other
activities already undertaken at home. In particular for Japan, Ando and
Kimura (2007) suggest that as a result of o⁄shoring, domestic employment
can be expanded since these operations are usually "complementary to the
rest of the value added chain". Remember that our setting does not allow for
spillovers e⁄ects between industries, so both the positive and negative e⁄ects
should be thought as taking place within the same industry.26
For instance, speci￿cation (1) shows that services and materials o⁄shoring
have short-run semi elasticities of 1.02 and -0.26 respectively. That is, an
increase of 1 percentage point in any of the o⁄shoring variables explains, on
average, a change of 1.02 and -0.26 percent in employment. In turn, long-run
elasticities are 20.4 and -5.2. The same reasoning applies to the rest of the
speci￿cations. Table 7 below sums up the information on the elasticities of
employment to o⁄shoring, both in the short ("SR) and long run ("LR).
Table 7: Short and long run elasticities (o⁄shoring)
OSS OSM OSS OSM OSS OSM OSS OSM
ε SR 1.02 -0.26 0.92 -0.14 1.03 -0.33 0.53 -0.23
ε LR 20.4 -5.2 18.4 -2.8 20.6 -6.6 10.6 -4.6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: as calculated from table 6; elasticities on (2) are not statistically signi￿cant.
Remember from table 3 the di⁄erent evolution in both o⁄shoring indices.
For our period of analysis we can see that while OSS raised, on average,
26For an analysis of o⁄shoring from a general equilibrium perspective see Egger and
Egger (2005), who explicitly account for spillovers, and Mitra and Ranjan (2007), who
develop a theoretical model to study the impact of o⁄shoring on sectoral and economywide
rates of unemployment.
30from 1.22 to 2.04 percent (0.82 percentage points), OSM went from 2.72 to
10.45 percent (7.73 percentage points). Combining this information with the
long-run elasticities in the second line of table 7, and with the change in em-
ployment, it is possible to quantify the e⁄ects of both kinds of o⁄shoring on
the Japanese labor market. To do that I will only focus on the long-run elas-
ticities as estimated from speci￿cations (3) and (4). In (2) the coe¢ cients are
not statistically signi￿cant and speci￿cation (1) shows signs of second-order
correlation in the residuals. Notice, however, that the elasticities calculated
from (1) and (3) are rather similar.
According to the JIP database, the level of employment in Japan for
our restricted sample of 83 industries grew, on average, about 18 percent
during 1980-2005 (around 100,000 workers). Multiplying the estimated long-
run elasticities times the average change in the o⁄shoring variables,27 and
expressing that as a proportion of the average change in employment, allows
us to get an idea of the size of the e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on employment.
From the estimation in (3) this implies an increase, on average, of around
1,000 workers due to services o⁄shoring and a loss of 2,900 workers due to
materials o⁄shoring. The net average loss is of approximately 1,900 workers
during 1980-2005. From (4) I estimate an average increase of about 500 work-
ers due to services o⁄shoring and a loss of 2,000 due to materials o⁄shoring,
totaling a net average loss of nearly 1,500. Since both total magnitudes are
negative they should be interpreted as the number of jobs that fail to open
due to o⁄shoring. Indeed, they only represent a small fraction of the total
increase in employment: between 1.9 percent in speci￿cation (3) to 1.5 in
(4).28
Table 8 goes over the o⁄shoring-induced changes in Japanese employment
in more detail. As can be seen from the table, the relative impact of OSS
and OSM is minor, both individually and overall. Aggregating these ￿gures,
our estimations suggest that, during 1980-2005, the total loss of jobs as a
result of o⁄shoring was negligible. Estimated ￿gures range from 160,000 in
speci￿cation (3) to 125,000 in (4) or, which is the same thing, from 1.9 to
1.5 percent of the total growth in employment.
27These changes must be divided by 100 to keep consistency with the variable as entering
the estimated equation.
28Recall that this analysis, due to its very characteristics, omits both the possible
spillover e⁄ects between industries, and the fact that some of them may, individually,
be experiencing di⁄erent e⁄ects of o⁄shoring from those averages presented here.
31Table 8: Average employment e⁄ects of o⁄shoring
Δ workers % Δ workers %
OSS 951 0.9 489 0.5
OSM -2,872 -2.8 -2,001 -2.0
Total -1,921 -1.9 -1,512 -1.5
(3) (4)
Note: average employment increase was 101,425 workers (or 18%).
4.3.2. Productivity e⁄ects
To see if o⁄shoring has any e⁄ect on productivity growth I estimate the
reduced-form equation in (18) relying once again on GMM estimation. As
argued before, our variables of interest are believed to be determined endoge-
nously. One more time, OSS and OSM ought to be understood as semi-
elasticities, for these variables are not transformed into logarithms. Table 9
below shows di⁄erent alternative speci￿cations estimated with the GMM-OD
estimator alone (Arellano-Bond 2-step). The reason for this is that both the
o⁄shoring and productivity variables are probably measured with errors. As
observed earlier, taking ￿rst di⁄erences (GMM-DIF estimator) to remove the
permanent industry-speci￿c e⁄ects tends to amplify such problems through
larger variances.
In order to avoid omitted variables biases I follow Fariæas and Mart￿n
(2009) and try to control for human capital intensity. For this I use the
share of high-skill workers that comes with the JIP database.29 Further,
following Hijzen et al. (2006) I control for the R&D expenditure, which is
a natural driver of the productivity growth. Since this variable does not
come with the JIP, I decide to use a proxy instead. This is the investment
in information technologies (as a share of GDP); particularly, the real value
of the investment in software by industries. We should expect both these
controls to have a positive e⁄ect on the TFP growth rate.













JIP) do not produce
satisfying results, as neither do the speci￿cations without period dummies.
29The JIP database o⁄ers data by industry on six di⁄erent occupations: (1) professionals
and technical workers, (2) managers and o¢ cials, (3) clerical and related workers, (4)
sales workers, (5) service workers, and (6) production process workers and laborers. Our
human capital variable is set equal to the sum of the ￿rst two categories, which are those
occupations usually involving a higher degree of specialization.
32Also, the explanatory variables enter the regressions both in levels and dif-
ferences. However, the control variables are not signi￿cant even though the
null fails to be rejected at the margin for our human capital variable in (2￿ )
and (3￿ ). Lagged terms of o⁄shoring are not included since these are strongly
non-signi￿cant, thus suggesting an immediate e⁄ect upon productivity.
Table 9: TFP growth, GMM estimation
(83 industries, 1980-2005)
Dependent variable: Δ τ’ Oit
(1’ ) (2’ ) (3’ ) (4’ ) (5’ ) (6’ )
GMM-OD GMM-OD GMM-OD GMM-OD GMM-OD GMM-OD
Δ τ’ Oit-1 0.009 0.008 0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
OSSit / 100 0.32 0.66‡ † 0.73‡ † 0.84‡ † 0.93‡ † 0.86‡ †
(0.36) (0.40) (0.42) (0.46) (0.51) (0.51)
OSMit / 100 0.02 0.08‡ 0.07‡ † 0.08‡ 0.07‡ † 0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
HK 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Δ HK -1.42† -1.39† -1.36† -1.31† -1.32†
(0.27) (0.26) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24)




Period dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sargan (p-value): 0.51 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.32
Adj. r
2 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
observations 2,075 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660
Note: all specifications estimated with Eviews and based on equation (18). GMM -OD is the Arellano -Bover
(1995)  estimator  in  orthogonal  deviations  (Arellano -B o n d  2 -step).  Results  from  1 -step  estimations  with  the
GMM-DIF or using τVAit and τJIPit as dependent variables were ambiguous. Results without period dummies
were also notsignificant. The offshoring indices (%) are divided by 100 so as to interpret the semi -elasticities
directly. Standard errors in parentheses and † , ‡ , and ‡ †  the usual levels of significance : 1%, 5%, and 10%;  Δ is
the difference operator, HK the share of high-skill workers, and R&D the share of software investment in GDP.
Notice that both coe¢ cients of services and materials o⁄shoring appear
with a positive sign, yet for the former the e⁄ect is signi￿cantly larger. Ac-
cording to the de￿nitions of our variables, a 1 percentage point expansion
in services o⁄shoring would bring about an increase in the TFP growth rate
ranging from 0.66 to 0.93 percent. On the other hand, for materials o⁄-
shoring it goes from 0.06 to 0.08 percent.30 These results are consistent with
30The values from (1￿ ) are not considered since it is to expect some bias due to an
omitted variables problem.
33those by Hijzen et al. (2006), who ￿nd that productivity growth would rise
by 0.17 percent. Their study is from 12,564 Japanese manufacturing ￿rms
during 1994-2000. There, o⁄shoring is measured directly and includes both
the value of subcontracting at arm￿ s length and the purchases of intermediate
inputs from a ￿rm￿ s foreign a¢ liates. However, their broad measure does not
account for the di⁄erences between services and materials inputs.
Multiplying the means of services and materials o⁄shoring from table 5
times the estimated coe¢ cients from table 9 gives the results in table 10.
These suggest that for the average o⁄shoring industry, the average annual
TFP growth is from 1.4 to 1.98 percentage points higher than had it not
engaged in services o⁄shoring. For materials o⁄shoring this goes from 0.48
to 0.64 additional percentage points. Hijzen et al. (2006), in turn, ￿nd that
o⁄shoring ￿rms show a higher average TFP growth by 1.8 percentage points.
Table 10: Average productivity e⁄ects of o⁄shoring
(2') (3') (4') (5') (6') Hijzen et al. (2006)
OSS 1.40 1.55 1.79 1.98 1.83
OSM 0.64 0.56 0.64 0.56 0.48
1.80
in percentage points
Note: means of OSS and OSM are 0.02 and 0.08 respectively (table 5).
5. Conclusions
Usual fears around o⁄shoring entail, above all, the loss of domestic jobs
that are now being imported in greater numbers. It is true that as even more
services become tradable (especially with the exponential growth of commu-
nications and Internet), more jobs will be at risk of being moved abroad.
But this argument loses sight of the other side of the story, namely, that
new jobs might be created locally due to a productivity boost or in response
of economic scarcity. We have seen in this paper how o⁄shoring might be
employment-friendly (e.g. services o⁄shoring) and how this innovative prac-
tice might hold the key as regards productivity improvement, something
Japan is certainly in need for.
To provide a full-￿ edged account of the issue for Japan, this paper ￿rst
reviews the main literature and ￿nds its applicability to our special case, then
analyzes the measurement issues to assess the phenomenon adequately, and
￿nally o⁄ers an econometric analysis for the whole economy during the period
341980-2005. Manufacturing as well as services industries are here considered,
and both materials and services o⁄shoring are brought into the analysis. The
data show materials o⁄shoring to be of much greater importance than services
o⁄shoring, in spite of the communications revolution tapping in every corner
of the globe. Moreover, with the ghost of the lost decade still looming over
the economy, services o⁄shoring remains on rather modest levels. Enough to
say that its growth rate was slightly higher than that for materials during
the 1980s, just to recede during the 1990s in a considerable proportion (in
fact, the average annual rate was negative during the 1990s and onwards).
The results of the econometric analysis suggest a positive employment
e⁄ect of services o⁄shoring which explains between 0.5 to 1 percent of the
average rise in employment. Materials o⁄shoring, oppositely, appears with a
negative sign, and the e⁄ect on employment goes from 2 to 3 percent of jobs
that fail to open out of the average increase in employment. The net negative
e⁄ect is around 1.5 to 2 percent approximately, which is a rather negligible
￿gure. However, this should be taken with care, because no spillover e⁄ects
among industries have been considered. Moreover, we must not forget about
the aggregation of our analysis, which might be hiding some relevant infor-
mation on the real e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on particular industries. In general, the
results presented here are robust to di⁄erent speci￿cations of the dynamic
labor demand, whether it refers to the control variables or the dependent
variable (additional results were omitted for the sake of brevity).
On the productivity side the results are also encouraging. Positive e⁄ects
of both types of o⁄shoring are found. The e⁄ect, for the average o⁄shoring
industry, goes from a 1.40 to an almost 2 percentage point increase in the
average annual TFP growth rate for services o⁄shoring. These results are
similar to those obtained by Hijzen et al. (2006) for Japan. For materials
o⁄shoring the numbers are smaller, perhaps as a consequence of the nature of
the tasks developed (usually involving a large number of low-skilled workers),
and imply an increase of 0.48 to 0.64 percentage points.
As seen here, o⁄shoring presents some frequently overlooked advantages.
First, the realization of the principle of comparative advantages cannot es-
cape the picture if we consider o⁄shoring as a particular form of trade, sug-
gesting that the negative employment e⁄ects have been largely exaggerated.
And second, the results o⁄ered here point in the direction of potential pro-
ductivity gains. However, one is left to wonder how much it will take for
policy-makers to start realizing this fact and avoid hindering the natural
process of pro￿t-seeking and e¢ ciency-seeking with well-intended measures.
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